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Summary
This paper is an examination of the new SCC emergency arbitration rules and a look at the 
consequences of the recent focus on emergency protection rules within the arbitration community.
It contains an analysis of the proposed new SCC rules and of the mechanisms and framework 
governing them, as well as an examination of the the similar rules of the ICDR institute, in effect 
since 2006, and of the impact that these and older emergency rules have had so far. 
Also included are references to, and a brief comparison with, the ICC rules of 1990 that would seem 
to be the progenitor of the modern emergency rules of recent years, with a view to what kind of 
impact the ICC rules have had on contemporary arbitration as well as what kind of legacy the rules 
have passed on to the community of today. What then follows is an analysis of alternatives to 
emergency arbitration, and of the consequences that the shift into this new type of arbitration might 
have.
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Abbreviations
AAA American Arbitration Association
Congo Case Societe Nationale des Petroles du Congo and Republic of Congo v TEP 
Congo. Paris court of appeal, 2003
IFCLA International Federation of Computer Law Associations
ICDR International Centre for Dispute Resolution
NYC Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
Also known as the New York Convention
SCC Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
IFCAI International Federation of  Commercial Arbitration Institutions
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
NAI Netherlands Arbitration Institute
CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
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Relevant Rules and Texts
Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration,  International Institute for Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution
SCC Rules on an Emergency Arbitrator on Interim Measures, Draft rules with notes, march 2009
ICC Rules of Arbitration, in force as from Jan 1998
United Nations Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, as of 
1958
Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention, Experience and Prospects, 
document and presentation at the 1999 UN New York Convention Day
Interim Measures in International Arbitration, IFCLA 2008, Richard Allan Horning
Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, in force Jan 1 1990, ICC
The ICC's pre-arbitral referee procedure – How valuable is it?, Ian Meredith and Marcus Birch, 
2008
The ICDR's Emergency Arbitration Procedure in Action, parts one and two, Guillaume Lemenez 
and Paul Quigley, 2008
First Court Decision on Pre-Arbitral Referee, Emmanuel Gaillard, New York Law Journal, june 5, 
2003
Recent Development in International Dispute Resolution Around the World, International Dispute 
Resolution, White & Case, september 2003
The Need for Speed, article by Dr. Francis Gurry, Director of WIPO Arbitration And Mediation 
Center, at the 1997 Biennial IFCAI Conference.
SCC strengthens its Arbitration Rules, article published 15 april 2009 on the SCC webpage
Law and practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Redfern and Hunter, 4th edition
ICDR Emergency Measures of Protection, art 37 of the ICDR rules
Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and
Resolution
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1. Introduction
On the 15th of April 2009 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) published an article on its 
homepage titled SCC strengthens its Arbitration Rules.1 It described the way that the SCC intended 
to proceed with the development of emergency arbitration rules. The article indicated that some 
very fundamental premises of arbitration, namely the way interim measures are handled, are 
undergoing changes, and it would seem that the way practitioners and clients perceive these 
premises, is changing at an even brisker pace. In essence it is about the realization that some 
instances of less desirable actions by an uncooperative party simply cannot be compensated by an 
award, but must be stopped before they take place.
In summary this text is about the consequences of these new rules, a posited lack of compatibility of 
the new emergency rules with the already existing framework of treaties - a framework that might 
be ill equipped to handle the increasing demands put on it from the new type of measures 
introduced by emergency arbitration.
The SCC is not the first institution to adopt new rules to face the current demands on arbitration, 
and I will therefore compare the SCC solution to other institutional solutions, and discuss their 
consequences. Now since the institutions are based, due to facts of geography and convenience, in 
different jurisdictions and therefore subject to different lex arbitri the consequences of the 
deployment of these new rules will vary, although some underlying principles should remain the 
same.
1.2 Method and Aim
Since these rules governing emergency arbitration are relatively new, they are not yet treated 
extensively (or hardly at all) in literature. Currently any doctrine on the subject is to be found in 
article form. Therefore, I will be relying foremost on articles published by different organizations 
and institutes, primarily dealing with the effects of the ICDR emergency arbitrations rules (active 
since 2006), as well as a few other recent and not so recent attempts at establishing this new type of 
procedure. The ICDR solution is the most interesting for this purpose since it is modern, as well as 
similar in many aspects to the SCC solution. Also of particular interest is the Congo Case of 2003, a 
case before the Paris Court of Appeal, of which the result and reasoning shed some light on some of 
the more problematic aspects of emergency measures.
My aim is to describe and analyse the possible effects of the SCC rules changes in the positive as 
well as negative. I will also discuss what kind of effects the general shift in attitude within the 
arbitration community as regards the importance of emergency measures will have. Note that at this 
stage I am postulating that there is, in fact, a change in attitude. Further, it is my intention to point to 
some weaknesses in this new system of emergency measures.
1 http://www.sccinstitute.com/?id=23696&newsid=25681
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2. Background - New Demands
2.1 Emergency relief
Emergency relief is a protective system of interim measures that have come to supplement the 
existing system of interim measures previously available. It is protective in that it serves to conserve 
the status quo between parties seeking arbitral relief. 
The rules of the system have in common across the different arbitral institutions that they are used 
before the arbitral tribunal has begun its proper work, even before the tribunal is constituted, 
thereby giving them the emergency nomination. 
They are employed by a sole emergency arbitrator, who is appointed in an expeditious manner.2 The 
purpose being to protect assets and information that might otherwise be altered or lost or otherwise 
rendered useless or of less value by one party to the detriment of the other, so as not to make the 
main arbitration proceedings meaningless.
Emergency relief is seeing increasing importance in the world of arbitration, and the different 
institutions are working on new rules to meet the demands on arbitral solutions today and tomorrow. 
2.2 Arbitration in general
"The practice of arbitration therefore, comes, so to speak, naturally to primitive bodies of law; and 
after courts have been established by the state and a recourse to them has become the natural 
method of settling disputes, the practice continues because  the parties to a dispute want to settle it  
with less formality and expense than is involved in recourse to the courts"3
The above passage describes the origins and history of arbitration fairly accurately. It is a method of 
solving disputes that pre-dates the formal court justice system, and it survives because of the 
qualities that it embodies that sets it apart from its younger sibling - qualities like speed, 
confidentiality, flexibility. Qualities that are getting more and more appreciated in recent history, to 
the point where it is again the preferred system for certain types of disputes and between certain 
combinations of parties. 
Just as the laws governing dispute resolution by court are constantly evolving, so is arbitration, and 
in recent years we are seeing new demands, particularly on speed and protective measures. The 
international world of business is operating at a rapid pace and issues that are not resolved quickly 
can often have great economic and political repercussions. And even though arbitration usually 
offers a speed advantage compared to national courts, this is often not enough for certain types of 
disputes, in which a late decision might be more or less useless. In the time it takes to constitute an 
arbitral tribunal that can issue interim orders, a lot of damage can be done by an uncooperative or 
careless party.
2 As far as I am aware no institute is currently contemplating rules whereby more than one emergency arbitrator is 
appointed per case.
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 1964, p 187 
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2.3 Interim measures
Interim orders have traditionally been the recourse when a party is in need of protective measures, 
so as not to lose monetary or intellectual resources etc. Hunter and Redfern explain the intent of 
interim measures as follows:
“During the  course of an arbitraion, it may become necessary for the arbitral tribunal or a national court to issue 
orders intended to preserve evidence, to protect assets, or in some other way to maintain the status quo pending the 
outcome of the arbitration proceedings themselves. Such orders take different forms  and go under different names.”4
 As touched upon in 2.1 the interim order solution requires a tribunal to be in existence and up to 
speed on the case so that it can issue orders. In the time window before the constitution of the 
tribunal the only way to receive the needed protection has traditionally been to make an application 
to a national court, which in many cases can provide an emergency injunction within 24 hours. 
However there are countries and situations in which this is not an option and where interim relief is 
far from an emergency procedure, often taking months to obtain. 
In addition, national injunctive measures is a blunt instrument on the international arena of business 
of today - it might not be enforceable in every jurisdiction where it needs to be, thus making it 
effectively useless in such areas as intellectual property protection etc, where assets travel easily 
across borders (and injunctions do not). Also, let us not forget that arbitration is often sought for the 
confidentiality and non-disclosure that it offers, an aspect that may indeed be lost if recourse to a 
national court is taken for emergency measures. This is where we come back to arbitration, which 
has been developed as an international tool for dispute resolution, and may offer a better framework 
for these types of issues. The powers of arbitral tribunals to order interim measures is widely 
recognized on an international scale and thus internationally enforceable, thanks to strong 
multilateral treaties and customs, so the issue of enforceability is less of a hurdle. Though there are 
other problems.
Not surprisingly it is far from an uncommon situation that the parties to an arbitral dispute have a 
vested interest in preserving certain assets and circumstances as they were at the outset of the 
conflict, and not find themselves in a situation where ones position is worsened before an award has 
been issued and the situation finally resolved.
This is where interim measures come into play, as a means to "maintain the status quo".5 Indeed, in 
the text of several institutional rules the practice of interim orders is explained using words such as 
protection, and conservation. The tribunals ability to act is however, as previously mentioned, 
restricted to the period after which the tribunal has been constituted - a serious drawback of the 
system, as evidenced by the recent interest in (and development of) emergency rules, where a more 
expeditious solution is sought. 
A national court may be the only alternative when important evidence and assets are at risk of 
disappearing in the weeks and months between the request for arbitration and the constitution of the 
actual tribunal. To make matters worse, in many cases the arbitral tribunal is handicapped by 
antiquated national legislation (this is, for example, the case with Greek6 and Italian7 law) making 
interim measures of protection close to an impossibility, or at least seriously restricted in their 
usefulness. This last matter is not a problem in Sweden, where the courts stand ready to assist in 
most cases of interim relief, but there still needs to be a tribunal in existence to decide on the matter.
4 Hunter & Redfern p. 393
5 Hunter & Redfern p. 393
6 Greek Code of Civil Procedure, art. 889
7 Italian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 818
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There are other complications in the area of interim measures, but what we will be concentrating on 
in this document are those associated with the timing of the relief, i.e. the problem that the current 
system of interim relief has with delivering the relief needed when it is needed, and what kind of 
problems the proposed system of emergency relief might give rise to when trying to remedy this 
weakness of the arbitral system.
2.4 Emergency arbitration
A problem in arbitration is that  the need for injunctive relief is greatest at the very first sign of a 
conflict (in which arbitration is sought). This is something that the arbitral process has been ill 
equipped to handle, seeing as how the tribunal must actually exist before it can issue any orders, 
interim or otherwise.
"Historically, the only option available to a party in this situation was to apply for interim relief in
court. But that option has many drawbacks. For example, the relief sought may not be available;  
court proceedings may be public, lengthy, costly, and veer in unexpected directions; and a foreign
party may fear that a national court will be biased in favor of its nationals."8
So, interim relief from a national court has its drawbacks, but nevertheless must be used until a 
tribunal can issue interim orders. Because even with the quoted drawbacks the need for protective 
measures may sometimes be of such importance that the negative aspects fade in comparison.
“An enforceable interim measure can maintain the status quo until the award is made and it can 
also secure assets out of which an award may be satisfied where a recalcitrant debtor is  
deliberately dissipating assets to render itself eventually judgment-proof.”9 
As stated in the above quote it is often of utmost importance (to one party) that certain assets and 
circumstances do not change from the outset of the conflict, when relief is sought, to the conclusion 
where a judgement is rendered by a tribunal. However, interim measures are often not fast-acting 
enough to preserve this status quo, and one party might indeed render itself effectively "judgement-
proof" by wilful obstruction in which contested assets are reduced in value, or even wholly 
depleted. Some form of assets are effectively irreplaceable (typically intellectual property, classified 
information etc.) and their destruction or manipulation are difficult to translate into monetary loss.
  
A solution was needed, and one was presented in 1990 by the ICC in the form of the ICC Pre-
arbitral Referee Procedure, offering the first real form of emergency relief in arbitration.
The ICC solution, as well as later solutions such as the one recently chosen by the SCC, all have in 
common that a system is put in place whereby interim protective measures can be put into play even 
before the start of the main arbitral proceedings, even before the constitution of the tribunal.
However, in a system as organic and interdependent as international arbitration, no solution is ever 
easy - considering, for example, that even ordinary interim measures (or orders) often encounter 
enforcement difficulties due to the fact that they may not satisfy the demands on finality set out by 
the New York Convention, how will emergency orders fare? This will be discussed in chapter 5, 
where we will examine the controversies and difficulties surrounding emergency arbitration.
8 The ICDR's Emergency Arbitrator Procedure in Action, the Dispute Resolution Journal, August/October 2008 issue. 
Article by Guillaume Lemenez and Paul Quigley, page 2.
9    Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention - Experience and Prospects, V. V. Veeder
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2.5 Current trends
In the business climate of today we are seeing an ever increasing importance of those kind of assets 
(primarily intellectual property) that can easily lose their value to one party if misused by another 
during a conflict. This has led to an increasing demand for protective measures that can ensure that 
the arbitral proceedings do not become effectively meaningless.
"There is a great demand for interim measures prior to the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.  
The SCC User Survey for 2008 indicates that 82 percent of counsel active in SCC arbitration 
believe that interim measures should be available from the initiation of the arbitration."10
The quoted user survey illustrates the problem of interim measures not being available at the very 
outset of  a conflict, when they are most needed, and the reason why they are now being made 
available.
2.5.1 Inadequacy 
Current institutional rules, as well as (and even more importantly) current international treaties, do 
not seem to satisfy the needs of parties as they have evolved over the time that the world has 
entered a stage where business is conducted at the speed of light. 
The reigning school of thought seems to be that the institutions need to make interim measures 
available when they are actually needed, i.e. at the very outset of an arbitration, as recognized at the 
IFCAI conference of 1997:
"[...] the problem in arbitration, however, is that the need for emergency relief is generally the first 
manifestation of the existence of a dispute and thus arises before an arbitration has been 
commenced and, in consequence, before the arbitral tribunal has been constituted. The claimant is  
therefore confronted with a situation in which it needs to obtain relief, but there is no arbitral  
tribunal in place to grant the relief."11 
As we can see the IFCAI recognized the problem in the late 1990's, even if it is not until around 10 
years later that we are seeing the results of this realization.  
2.5.2 Speed
In a world where intellectual property and digital information is of ever increasing value it is natural 
that the demands on dispute resolution in which these type of assets are involved change. But even 
with more traditional assets involved the speed and scope of today's contractual dealings defy the 
capacities of most rules of arbitration. Even though arbitration is often preferred because it can 
produce enforceable final decisions in a more timely manner than the national courts, it still lacks 
the capacity to protect a party from the loss of assets if the speed at which an injunctive measure 
can be employed is not enough. 
 
2.5.3 Protection
As mentioned in the introduction, some instances of less desirable actions by an uncooperative 
10 - Linn Bergman, SCC strengthens its Arbitration Rules, article published 15 april 2009 on the SCC webpage.
11 "The Need for Speed", article by Dr. Francis Gurry
Director, WIPO Arbitration And Mediation Center, at the 1997 Biennial IFCAI Conference.
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party simply cannot be compensated by an award, but must be stopped before they take place. 
Again, this view is increasingly more common in a world where intellectual property is such a 
valuable commodity, and the abuse of such is often impossible to measure in terms of monetary 
worth, after the damage has been done.
3. Examination of the current solutions
Three institutional solutions appear as the most interesting for further examination. The SCC 
solution because of being the most current. The ICC solution by virtue of being the oldest and still 
functioning solution. And the ICDR solution by virtue of being deployed only a few years ago by a 
major institution, thus having a modern approach, but not so modern that we cannot already 
examine some of its effects. 
Worth mentioning is that fairly soon emergency arbitration may come full circle when the ICC 
updates its rules - the prevailing thought is that this will happen within a few years. Unfortunately I 
do not have substantiated preliminary thoughts as to the direction of the changes contemplated, but 
it still bears speculation. What we do know is that the ICC rules have been criticized as lacking in a 
few critical areas, and we will examine these to see what (if any) parallels can be drawn to the more 
modern rules of, primarily, the SCC.
3.1 The SCC solution
The reader is asked to bear in mind that at the time the main work on this paper was done the SCC 
solution was still a work in progress12. I base my observations on the draft rules as presented April 
15, 2009.
3.1.1 Main Features and their meaning
Eight features are presented by the SCC as being of distinguishing importance when crafting new 
emergency rules.13 They are described and commented below.
A. The rules are made part of the SCC Rules, thus applicable to all disputes where the parties  
have agreed to arbitrate under the SCC Rules.
For the parties to take advantage of the Emergency Arbitration option there does not need to be a 
separate provision made for this eventuality. A modification of article 32 of the SCC Rules points us 
to a new appendix of the Rules (Appendix II) which deals with Emergency Arbitration. If parties 
are wary of the these emergency measures then they will have to specify in their arbitration 
agreement that there will be no Emergency Arbitration (a so called "opt-out solution"). This is a a 
similar solution to the ICDR solution of 2006 as well as the NAI (with their Summary Arbitration 
Proceedings14), but differs from the very early rules on emergency procedures set out by the ICC in 
199015 in which a separate agreement is required. The reason is to increase the impact of the new 
rules by giving the parties the option when it is most needed. The ICC rules of 1990 were hardly 
12 The rules were finalized in 2010 with minor changes.
13 SCC strengthens its Arbitration Rules, article published 15 april 2009 on the SCC webpage.
14 Arbitration Rules of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Art. 42
15 ICC Pre-arbitral Referee Procedure.
11
ever opted for16, at least not for the first decade of their existence and it has been speculated that the 
provision of a separate agreement was the reason17. There may have been other factors as well, such 
that the world of arbitration might not have been ready for emergency measures until more 
recently.18 
One could argue that the SCC solution is a self evident one if the prevailing theory in arbitration 
today is that emergency arbitration is needed, then obviously the option to use it should be part of 
the normal steps taken to initiate an arbitration. The ICC chose a different route back in 1990, but 
are currently in the process of revising its rules and it is expected that the institute will change to the 
opt-out solution. We will not know for certain for several more years, but in the field of arbitration 
this new emphasis on the importance of emergency interim measures seems to be rather unified, and 
so it is not anticipated that the ICC will keep the present opt-in solution. Surprisingly though, when 
the WIPO started to consider rules for emergency relief in 1997 it considered19 a solution similar to 
the one used by the ICC - i.e. the opt-in solution in which the parties need to actively decide 
beforehand that emergency relief will be available if needed. And this was well after the fact had 
been established that the ICC model was not having the desired or expected impact.
B. Initiation of arbitration is not necessary.
Article 32 of the proposed SCC Rules contains a new provision:
32.4 - Provisions with respect to interim measures requested before the case has been referred to the
Arbitral Tribunal are set out in Appendix II.20
With the addition of the new Appendix II and art 32.4 it is possible to provide interim measures 
before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Appendix II Art 1.1 - A party may apply for the appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator. Such application 
may be made at any time until the case has been referred to the Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to Article 18 of the
SCC Rules.
Being able to offer interim measures before the constitution of the tribunal would seem to be a 
mandatory provision of any rules dealing with emergency arbitration, since the purpose of the 
procedure is to produce orders concerning circumstances requiring immediate attention, 
circumstances which cannot wait for the constitution of the tribunal (a process that can often take 
weeks).
 However, it is also a very fundamental step away from traditional arbitration and the New York 
Convention, seeing as how the NYC of 1958 was not drafted with emergency arbitration in mind. 
Redfern and Hunter state, on the issue of inability to act prior to the formation of the tribunal that 
"[...], the  arbitral tribunal cannot issue interim measures until the tribunal has been established.  
The point may seem so obvious as  to be hardly worth mentioning."21 
16 Unsubstantiated information indicates that the procedure may only have been used 9 times between 1990 and 2008.
17 Hunter and Redfern p.396
18 See also 3.1.1.B
19 "The Need for Speed", article by Dr. Francis Gurry
Director, WIPO Arbitration And Mediation Center, at the 1997 Biennial IFCAI Conference.
20   SCC Rules on an
Emergency Arbitrator on Interim Measures
DRAFT NEW RULES WITH NOTES
March 2009
21 Law and practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Redfern and Hunter, 4th edition p. 395
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Clearly something has changed in the 5 years since this was written.
We will examine this issue separately but we can also establish for now that the NYC concerns 
itself with "awards to which the convention applies".22 We will try to establish where emergency 
arbitral orders or awards might fit into this, considering that the SCC states that "Initiation of  
arbitration is not necessary" and that the NYC concerns itself with arbitral awards. Can there really 
be an award when there has been no arbitration in the traditional sense?
C. The power of the Emergency Arbitrator is limited in scope to decisions on interim measures 
and in time to the referral of an initiated arbitration to an Arbitral Tribunal. The power of the 
Emergency Arbitrator thus ceases when the Arbitral Tribunal takes charge of the case.
Examination of the new Appendix II (article 1.2) reveals the scope of the power of the Emergency 
Arbitrator. Referring us back to article 32 the appendix tells us that with regards to interim measures 
the emergency arbitrator has the same power that a normal tribunal would have, but the scope of her 
power is limited to interim measures only. In fact, her powers to act end as soon as the provisions of 
SCC Rules article 18 are fulfilled, i.e. when the arbitral tribunal has been appointed and the advance 
on costs has been paid.
"The Emergency Arbitrator’s mandate to decide on interim measures is proposed to be equivalent  
to the mandate of the later constituted Arbitral Tribunal. The Emergency Arbitrator shall thus  
decide on interim measures applying the provisions in Article 32 of the SCC Rules which means 
that he or she shall grant any interim measure that is deemed appropriate, that the requesting party 
may be ordered to provide appropriate security and that the decision may take the form of an order 
or an award"23
The final words of this section is also of special interest in that it is proposed that the decision of the 
Emergency Arbitrator take the form of an order or an award. This is of course of importance when 
dealing with the execution of said decision, and in determining what an emergency measure 
actually is when trying to connect it to the New York Convention. More on this later.
 
An interesting question here is whether this new step in the arbitral proceedings leaves any new 
openings for stalling or other tactical options. A possible scenario could be that one party does 
everything in its power to delay the constitution of the arbitral tribunal so that the Emergency 
Arbitrator can render a decision that is somehow of long term benefit to that party.
D. The other party shall be notified of the application (i.e. not ex parte).
A separate article of Appendix II (Article 3) deals with the issue of ex parte notification. The bar is 
set high in that the SCC secretariat shall notify the other party "as soon as an application for an 
Emergency Arbitrator has been received". It is of special importance to note that there need not 
have been a request for arbitration filed for a party to request emergency arbitration! 
"It has been discussed to allow applications for an Emergency Arbitrator only
in cases where arbitration has been initiated but that option has been ruled out as it limits the 
usefulness of the provisions without providing any advantages"24
22 Hunter & Redfern p.526
23 Rules on an Emergency Arbitrator on Interim Measures NOTES (article published on the SCC homepage April 15 
2009. Page 2. 
24 Rules on an Emergency Arbitrator on Interim Measures NOTES (article published on the SCC homepage April 15 
2009. Page 2.
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Without this provision any emergency measures  taken could come as something of a surprise to the 
non-requesting party, considering the short timespan from request to action, and it is therefore of 
critical importance that they are informed in a timely fashion. That the SCC institute take on the 
task of informing the other affected parties would seem to be the norm, with other institutes 
handling this aspect in a similar manner. If this was not not the case we would likely see some 
underhanded behaviour in this matter, even with an obligation to inform there could still be a lot to 
be gained by waiting until the last moment to inform, or even not to inform and accept any 
consequences.
Worth noticing at this point is that the ICDR chose to lay the burden of notification on the initiating 
party, rather than on the institution. One of the clearest differences from the SCC rules. 25
E. An Emergency Arbitrator shall be appointed within 24 hours from the application was made 
For reasons of simplicity and in the interest of speed the SCC has chosen to have the board appoint 
the emergency arbitrator, and leave this potentially time consuming task out of the hands of any 
recalcitrant party.
The jurisdiction of the SCC to administer an application for the appointment of an Emergency 
Arbitrator is proposed to be determined on the same basis as a Request for Arbitration."26
The ICDR employed this same reasoning when drafting their provision giving a time frame of one 
business day (from request to appointment) in 2006, and for good reason, since the appointment of 
arbitrators is a well recognized area for the employment of stalling tactics in traditional arbitration, 
and allowing the parties to have a say could result in the loss of much of the benefit of an 
emergency procedure. 
The SCC considered the one business day model but arrived at the less uncertain 24 hour frame. 
Perhaps it is not out of place to characterize the SCC  solution as the more modern and truly 
international one, considering national holidays and the like. In any event, making the decision on 
appointment an administrative one is likely the only viable option when it comes to emergency 
arbitration. If the parties were allowed to have a part in the decision making, other than a purely 
advisory one, the speed of the process would likely become compromised to a point where the 
emergency aspect was lost.
 This being said the ICDR has on occasion set up conference calls with the parties prior to 
appointing the emergency arbitrator, with a view to collecting their opinions and preferences. This 
is something which is not explicitly mentioned in the SCC draft rules of April 15, but one would 
assume the option of collecting the parties opinions is not excluded because of this, if the parties are 
amenable, and if there is time to accomplish it before party interests become damaged.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that any emergency arbitrator appointed by the SCC will be 
considered biased in the arbitration proper when it starts, and so the draft of April 15 contains a 
provision excluding her from appointment to the arbitral tribunal, unless the parties jointly agree 
they want her on it. This is because the emergency arbitrator will otherwise come to have formed 
strong opinions on different aspects of the case, and perhaps even have a prideful interest in 
maintaining whatever status or outcome he or she came to preserve through an emergency order.
25 ICDR Emergency Measures of Protection article 37b
26 as Rules on an Emergency Arbitrator on Interim Measures NOTES (article published on the SCC homepage april 15 
2009. Page 2.
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In the event of a successful challenge to the appointment of an emergency arbitrator, under both the 
SCC as well as the ICDR rules, the board will appoint a replacement. 
 However, the ICDR has chosen, at least in one case, to take a very proactive and perhaps surprising 
role in the interim time the replacement was being appointed. The ICDR used the time to invite the 
challenging party to submit  its response so as not to slow down the proceedings.27 In this case the 
party cooperated despite the unusual circumstances. The way the ICDR institute acted is, however, 
in line with the spirit of emergency rules - the ability to offer effective protective interim measures 
is more important than keeping to strict administrative procedures.
F. An emergency decision shall be made within five days from the date the application was 
referred to the Emergency Arbitrator.
ICDR procedure seems to take 14 days on average. So then, is the SCC aim of 5 days an ambitious 
time frame? One aspect that needs careful consideration is that stalling tactics have always been 
popular in arbitration, so much so that in law school coursework there are even lectures on the 
subject. Is it reasonable to expect that a decision will be made in the short timespan the SCC has set 
out if stalling tactics are developed and routinely used? The SCC does not elaborate much on these 
matters in the material published for consideration, nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that 
deliberation on the subject has in fact taken place, and that the probable conclusion of these 
deliberations by the SCC drafters is that time extensions will likely become norm. Extensions of the 
self imposed 5 day time limit is something that the institution is empowered to do, and it is 
routinely used throughout the course of normal arbitration. 
However, a short timespan does go very well in hand with what is expected from a procedure for 
emergency interim measures. The ICDR practice of taking two weeks on average to deliver 
emergency relief defies the intention of emergency arbitration, which is all about maintaining the 
status quo - two weeks is a veritable eternity in which anything could happen. Then again, the 
emergency arbitrator is also empowered to order interim measures in the traditional sense, so truly 
pressing matters could be dealt with even before the emergency decision is delivered, in the form of 
less definitive interim orders not in the form of an emergency award (the character of emergency 
awards and their status, or not, of actual award will be discussed later). Having an interim order 
enforced against an uncooperative party in the even shorter time frame between initiation of 
emergency arbitration and delivery of an emergency award would pose other difficulties though. 
However, courts worldwide have more experience enforcing interim orders than they have 
enforcing emergency awards so in some cases it might actually be worthwhile. There are currently 
no examples of this unusual procedure, so even if possible it is highly theoretical, 
G. The decision is no longer valid if arbitration is not initiated or if the case is not referred to an 
Arbitral Tribunal within a certain time from the date the decision was made.
This provision would seem to add a bit of uncertainty to the process, if it was not for the reasoning 
of the SCC drafters, which suggests that it will simply be up to the emergency arbitrator to renew 
his or her decision, on application by a party (or even on his own initiative). The provision reflects 
the fact that the emergency decision is not a true arbitral (final) decision, and is not intended to 
finally resolve anything. This is of course problematic for enforcement purposes, seeing as the 
NYC, the primary enforcement tool in international arbitration, deals only with awards that are 
final. More on this later.
27 The "Energy Case" of 2008
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H. The decision may be renewed or altered by the Emergency Arbitrator and later by the Arbitral  
Tribunal.
This may be the most problematic provision of the suggested rules. It suggests to us that a decision 
by an emergency arbitrator might lacks the finality required for enforcement under international 
treaties, especially in conjunction with the G. provision above. The explicit allowance of alterations 
of the decision suggests something other than a final decision, and the fact that a second instance 
(the arbitral tribunal) can impose their own take on the decision at a later date likewise tells us that 
this type of award (if indeed that is what it is) might not  be compatible with the requirements of 
finality in the NYC. 
There is also the problematic aspect of  the arbitral tribunal perhaps not having the same opinion on 
the merits of the case as the emergency arbitrator, thus creating a situation where, potentially, we 
could see a reduction in the predictability of the process. The consequences of this are hard to say 
anything about, but it is not far fetched to reason that a party would go and act in a certain way after 
receiving a beneficial emergency decision, only to then have the decision altered into something 
that makes the chosen course of action less than desirable, perhaps harming the party. 
3.2 Other institutional solutions
Two institutions are of special interest in comparison to the SCC, namely the ICDR and the ICC. 
The ICDR has a US centric outlook on arbitration, being grounded geographically in the US and 
aspected towards the common law tradition. But that notwithstanding, the rules implemented by the 
institution in 2006 are at first glance very similar in many respects to what the SCC are 
implementing and because of that a deeper look is warranted. 
The ICC has the distinction of being the progenitor of emergency arbitration, implementing rules in 
1990 that, while not being titled emergency arbitration, tried to fill that same purpose and carried 
(and still carry) important distinctions that make an examination of what kind of effect they have 
had interesting. Perhaps they offer the only set of rules that has been available long enough to draw 
any conclusions from, at this point. 
3.2.1 The ICDR Solution
The International Centre for Dispute Resolution implemented their solution on emergency 
arbitration in May 1 of 2006. It consists of a new article (Emergency Measures of Protection - Art 
37) incorporated in the Centres existing rules (International Arbitration Rules) on arbitration, and 
deals explicitly with emergency arbitration. It is more or less contemporary with the SCC rules and 
was drafted with the same goals and with the same considerations in mind. The AAA (of which the 
ICDR is a part) did offer rules for emergency measures in 1999 already, but they suffered from the 
same main drawback as has been identified in the ICC rules of 1990, in that they had to be 
specifically agreed on for inclusion by the parties in their arbitration agreement, and thus were not 
frequently used. 
We might look upon the ICDR rules as an upgraded version of the AAA rules of 1999 with some 
important improvements, and considering the normal pace of change in the field of arbitration the 
ICDR adjusted swiftly. As a comparison, the ICC is only now starting work on new rules, two 
decades after implementation of their current rule set (a set with several identifiable flaws).
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Article 37 of the ICDR Emergency Measures of Protection is specifically designed to be an 
effective alternative to seeking emergency relief from the courts. By using the so called "opt-out 
solution" (i.e. the option is there unless specifically excluded) it is made sure that the option is 
always available when needed. This seems to be the prevalent and preferred method in modern 
emergency pre-arbitral theory today, and for good reason, considering the poor track record of 
usage of the precursor rules of the ICC and AAA. 
And indeed, the article 37 rules were used at least four times, that we know of, in the first two years 
of existence, proving that there was a demand. 
In fact, the ICDR goes one step further in that the emergency rules apply if the parties have agreed 
on arbitration before the ICDR regardless of whether the ICDR rules are to be used or not28. In fact, 
the ICDR emergency rules also apply when parties to a conflict with international connotations 
specify AAA arbitration but do not specify AAA rules - this is of course peculiar to the AAA/ICDR 
relationship but it does show the clear intent of the drafters that emergency arbitral rules should be 
made readily available. This latest provision was actually the reason emergency measures were used 
in two of the four known cases (as of May 2008). 
In reality many seemingly domestic conflicts should be able to benefit from the emergency rules 
under AAA arbitration since the AAA apply article 1.3 of the UNCITRAL rules to determine if a 
conflict is international, and this provision allows for a broad definition of what is to be considered 
international.
Unlike the proposed SCC rules ICDR emergency procedures may not be filed for until a request for 
arbitration has been made. The SCC rules could be considered as more evolved in this regard - 
fulfilling the mission statement of making interim measures available when they are needed (i.e. at 
the very outset of a conflict). Just as with the proposed SCC rules the board of the ICDR institution 
selects the emergency arbitrator, and within a similar time frame of one business day, although as 
discussed earlier the SCC has chosen the less confusing and more internationally viable 24 hour 
model as opposed to the business day model of the ICDR. The business day model has proven to be 
problematic in that different cultures and parts of the world observe different holidays, this problem 
is eliminated with a concrete 24 hour allotment.
The ICDR has proven its commitment to emergency arbitration by quickly responding to challenges 
to the choice of arbitrator29 and quickly offering a replacement. Quickly in this case being within 
another business day. The question becomes, can we expect the same from the SCC? It is reasobale 
to do so, since both institutions use a similar method of appointment (board appointment), and 
neither requires (but sometimes offer to take, situation permitting) input from the parties to appoint 
the emergency arbitrator.
Just as with the proposed SCC rules the tribunal, once established, has the power to modify the 
emergency decision, and the emergency arbitrator can not be appointed as a member of the tribunal 
unless the parties agree to include him or her. What is less clear is if the emergency arbitrator can 
still render a decision after the tribunal has been constituted if she has not done so yet and a 
protective measure is still needed (and the tribunal is not yet ready to act on the issue). The issue 
has not come up so far. However, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution30 
28 ICDR rules, art 1
29 the "Energy Case"
30 “The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, known as the CPR Institute, is a New York City 
membership-based nonprofit organization that promotes excellence and innovation in public and private dispute 
resolution, serving as a primary multinational resource for avoidance, management, and resolution of business-
related disputes.” - http://cpradr.org
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has issued guidelines in their Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration that may be an indication of 
how the arbitration community would interpret the ICDR (and indeed the SCC) rules.
“[...]if the tribunal is constituted before the special arbitrator has rendered an award or order,
the special arbitrator shall retain jurisdiction to render such award or order unless and until the 
tribunal directs otherwise.”31
So, in special circumstances we might see an emergency arbitrator actually working in tandem with 
the tribunal, offering strong emergency support during the initial phase of the arbitration. This is 
interesting because the consequences when it comes to enforcement are hard to predict. The 
situation as such is hardly without precedent, since it has long been practice to seek emergency 
relief from a national court while waiting for the tribunal to work through the merits of the case, the 
difference being that the tribunal does not have such a close relationship to or indeed any power 
over a national court, which it does over an emergency arbitrator working under these conditions. It 
is an aspect worth examining in more detail after some time has passed.
3.2.2 The ICC Solution
It is less clear if the ICC process, Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, is truly emergency 
arbitration. It was developed in a period in which the concept of emergency arbitration was not yet a 
recognized part of the arbitral process, and it lacks much of the features common to emergency 
rules of today. The rules were never intended to be of universal use, but rather an optional tool, 
whereas the modern institutional rules have a clear intent of changing the way in which arbitration 
is conducted (to always include emergency arbitration when needed). It is interesting to note that in 
its standard model clause for incorporation of its rules in a dispute resolution process the ICC 
clearly states that:
 "The extent to which the ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure are recognized and 
accepted may vary from one country to another depending on the applicable law(s). Parties 
wishing to have recourse to these Rules should ensure that they conform with the law(s) applicable 
to each case". 
This tells us without doubt that the concepts introduced by the ICC in 1990 were indeed something 
new in the world of arbitration, and that there was an acute awareness that the process might not be 
supported by the international framework that is in place to facilitate arbitration. Or at least not 
fully. It is also interesting that the ICC leave the burden of ensuring that their emergency rules are of 
actual use in a given case to the parties. The emergency rules being implemented in recent years, by 
different institutions, have in common that the administrative responsibilities and decisions are 
shouldered by the institutions, to facilitate the proceedings and ensure speedy delivery of an 
emergency order. The arbitral framework of 20 years ago could simply not be relied upon to support 
the execution of emergency orders and the ICC knew this, and so refused to put itself in a position 
of responsibility (or liability).  
Exactly how the ICC rules work is not of much interest for our purposes as they will shortly (within 
a few years) be reworked and updated to match what other institutions, like the SCC, are trying to 
accomplish. They are however the forerunner in the field, making it worthwhile to discuss them in 
context, updated or not (and even perhaps more so the non-updated version).
31 14.13 - Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration, International Institute for Conflict Prevention and
Resolution
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4. Alternatives.
4.1 "Fast Track" Arbitration
In the same climate that prompted the creation of the ICC's Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, and 
also initiated by the ICC, there was significant work being done to try to speed up the proceedings 
of ordinary arbitration. The term fast-track arbitration was first coined in the 1990s, when the 
duration of arbitration proceedings in international economic transactions was increasingly 
criticised.
In the face of this criticism, the major arbitral institutions searched for solutions. At the beginning 
of the 1990s a few fast-track cases, with highly reduced deadlines, conducted before the 
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC made a name for themselves, being brought to a close 
within an extremely short time and thus gaining a certain prominence. At the end of 1991, four 
related arbitration proceedings with a value in dispute amounting to several $100 million were 
initiated with the ICC, two of which were introduced under general arbitration clauses, while the 
other two were to be settled under fast-track provisions. The subject of the dispute was a complex 
redetermination of purchaseprice for a commodity product. The parties were related but not 
identical. There were numerous petitions regarding the consolidation of the fast-track cases with the 
two other cases, as well as questions of jurisdiction and of the independence of one of the arbitrators 
nominated by the parties. These cases combined classic characteristics of difficult arbitral 
proceedings with the added pressure of an extremely tight deadline. However, one of the two fast-
track proceedings was concluded within a period of only 60 days, the other within a period of 80 
days. 
Exactly one year later, again at the beginning of the year, in another ICC case, the parties carried out 
a dispute in the fast (track) lane in the truest sense of the word: Since a dispute developed between a 
racing team and the host of the F1 championship immediately before a Grand Prix race, regarding 
the proper varnishing of two race cars. A prompt decision was required, and the ICC Arbitration 
Court succeeded in making such a prompt decision—just 38 days passed between commencement 
of the arbitration proceedings and the rendering of the award and the participation of the racing 
team in the imminent Grand Prix was thereby ensured. In this case the speed and protective effect of 
the proceedings come close to that of emergency arbitration.
However, we need to bear in mind that the purpose of emergency arbitration is primarily a 
protective one, and not to render lasting awards in the traditional sense. Fast track arbitration, by 
virtue of its greater speed, do fulfil some of the same functions. It (for example) gives less time for 
an uncooperative party to negatively affect the interests of all parties, before a final judgement is 
rendered. But then the speed in which a final award can be delivered is not always the critical 
component in arbitration, but rather how quickly the status quo can be assured.  
Ideally all arbitrations should be conducted at a quick pace. The shorter overall deadlines of fast-
track arbitration might still mean that it would be useful in a protective capacity. However, it is not 
always possible to entice the parties into following the fast-track model, due to lack of cooperation 
between them. Indeed, to function at all fast track arbitration needs cooperative parties, as it is 
based on the presumption that both sides actually want a speedy resolution (favourable or not), with 
little of the incitements available to an emergency arbitrator to make this happen. This feature may 
not make it a true alternative to emergency arbitration, since the true emergency procedures are 
highly adversarial in character, while fast track arbitration is mostly employed between parties that 
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are generally on good terms and want to keep it that way.
In any case, neither the ICC nor the LCIA (the other great proponent of "fast track" during the 
1990's) actually included any specific rules system supporting this form of arbitration in their latest 
revisions, although the ICC tried the process in the Formula One case described above.32
4.2 Streamlining
Redfern and Hunter discuss different strategies that institutions might want to codify in their 
procedural rules in order to speed up arbitral proceedings.33 These strategies could eventually stand 
as a separate system that parties could choose to employ instead of the ordinary rules.
 Like with the early ICC fast-track solution this would require that the parties agreed beforehand 
which system to use, alternatively that the institutional rules were drafted in such a way that it was 
at the arbitrators discretion which system to use. Either way it would create a higher level of 
flexibility, but at the cost of foreseeability (or vice versa). 
The suggestions that Redfern and Hunter make that are most interesting from an emergency 
protection standpoint are that the arbitrator should try to
- Identify the burning points at issue first and foremost.
- that exact and unyielding time limits should be strictly imposed, and 
- that the arbitrator should not give extensive reasoning for his decision. 
Also, only a single arbitrator would be used, so as to speed up decision making. These conditions 
would perhaps fill some of the same functions as the new generation of emergency arbitration rules 
do, but would come with its own set of problems since some measure of legal security invariably 
must be sacrificed in order to achieve these goals. For example, trust in the arbitral process might be 
damaged if extensive reasoning is not evident, or if unyielding time limits hinder a party from 
properly presenting its case, etc.
4.3 Ad Hoc
Ad hoc arbitration could fill the same role as emergency arbitration as regards protective measures, 
since the proceedings will take shape according to the needs of the parties. Because of the adaptive 
nature of hoc rules, there could be rules constructed to handle the same kind of problems that 
emergency arbitration was set up to handle. And this would seem ideal, if it was not for the fact that 
ad hoc arbitration requires a close cooperation between the parties to be of any effectiveness at all, 
something that is of going to be problematic in most of the situations where protective measures are 
needed. Also, since ad hoc procedures are usually set up to solve a dispute after it has arisen, and 
are thus not in place at the critical initial time period when emergency arbitration is of most use, it is 
doubtful if the purposes of the two systems are of enough similarity for one to ever act in place of 
the other.
32 ICC case no. 10211/AER
33 Hunter and Redfern, p.342
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5. Complications.
With any new system of rules there will be attached effects that aren't immediately evident. In the 
sections below we will discuss a few of the areas in which emergency rules of arbitration might 
become problematic.
5.1 National legislation and national courts
Most nations party to the New York Convention have incorporated a few similar rules in their 
national arbitration acts that are of interest for our purposes. These concern the speed and scope of 
emergency decisions and in the case of the Swedish Arbitration Act they are found in section 54 
under the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards heading. Art. 54.2 states that a foreign 
award shall not be enforced in Sweden if;
"the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case".
It is in the nature of emergency arbitration that it is fast. This is a clear aim of the establishment of 
the new emergency arbitral institutional rules around the world. In the case of the proposed SCC 
rules, initiation of the arbitration proper is not even needed, and the emergency arbitrator is to be 
appointed within only 24 hours of the request, and is then expected to render a decision no later 
than five days after the referral of the application for emergency arbitration. 
Obviously this is a short timespan to render decisions on potentially complicated matters - the 
ICDR rules, similar to the SCC rules in many other ways, allows for a comparatively longer 
timespan in which to render a decision. Approximately two weeks have been used in the cases that 
are known, and even then voices have been raised in concern about the speed. Only having five 
days, in the SCC case, to present the information pertinent to ones case before a decision  is 
rendered may not satisfy these common national rules about giving the parties enough time for 
presentation, with the result that unenforceable awards are rendered. 
But then again, there is nothing in the SCC rules actively denying a party the opportunity for 
presentation, and it is strongly implied in the draft proposal work that there is to be no ex parte 
relief granted (and explicitly, no ex parte notification) - this may very well mean that, in practice, 
the SCC emergency arbitrator will not be able to render a decision within the five days allotted. 
There is however a provision for extension if the circumstances require it. In the proposal it is stated 
that; 
"the Emergency Arbitrator shall conduct the proceedings in such manner as he or she considers 
appropriate but always in an impartial, practical and expeditious manner giving each party an 
equal and reasonable opportunity to present its case." 
In this statement lies a strong implication that the fairness of the proceeding will not be 
compromised in the pursuit of speed.
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5.1.1 Mandate
The scope of the emergency arbitrators power is fortunately not an issue with the SCC rules, as it is 
proposed to be the same as that of the normal arbitral tribunal which is later appointed. This is not 
the case with the ICDR rules where the emergency arbitrator is given a more specific mandate;
"to order or award any interim or conservancy measure the emergency arbitrator deems necessary,  
including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property"
A challenge could conceivably be made as to whether an emergency arbitrator, under the ICDR 
rules, has acted in a conservatory or even necessary capacity. This would be harder under the SCC 
rules since the SCC arbitrator has a broader mandate.
However, courts of the USA that have handled challenges to arbitrator powers concerning interim 
relief under ICDR emergency rules seem to have taken a pro emergency measure stance, and have 
chosen not to undermine the authority of arbitrators when it comes to interim relief. For example it 
was stated in the Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office case that:
“It is not the role of the courts to undermine the comprehensive grant of authority to
arbitrators by prohibiting an arbitral security award that ensures a meaningful final award.”
Even though this is the standpoint of US courts there is little reason to suspect that the reasoning 
would vary in any significant way elsewhere. The willingness to make the international arbitral 
system work is a global consensus.  
5.1.2 Enforcement
An award is only enforceable by a national court, drawing jurisdiction  from its national laws and 
international conventions (in practice, the New York Convention).
Even without considering the special case of emergency awards there are issues with enforceability 
of interim measures, with some voices within the arbitration community considering mere orders 
and interim awards as lacking the dignity of proper awards, and thus being largely unenforceable 
under the NYC. Without effective enforcement any theoretic reasoning here or elsewhere is 
meaningless, so will courts (worldwide) truly enforce emergency awards? 
It all comes down to how the courts reason on the criteria leading up to enforcement, such as 
compatibility with treaties, national legislation, the dignity of emergency awards etc. The ICDR 
solution, as previously discussed, is of interest here as it has all of the distinguishing features of 
modern emergency protection. In particular it bears a strong resemblance to the SCC solution.
US courts have had plenty of occasion to weigh in on the ICDR solution since 2006 when it was 
implemented, and so far the enforcement rate looks very good indeed for emergency arbitration. 
The protective measures rendered in the form of emergency awards seem to have been mostly 
upheld by the courts. 
Other than the track record of the ICDR rules it is worth considering how courts treat interim 
measures, since these are the progenitor of the emergency award measure, and have forced the 
courts to consider many of the same points at issue as with emergency awards. And we know that 
interim measures are indeed largely enforced.
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5.2 Compatibility with existing treaties and conventions
This is really about to what extent emergency measures and emergency arbitration is compatible 
with the framework that supports and makes international arbitration possible currently. Consider 
for example that the intent of the all important New York Convention is the enforcement of final 
awards across international boundaries and that, as has been discussed, emergency measures have 
very little in the way of finality. Is the framework really up to the task that the arbitration 
community is about to set it? Is the global and national will and intent there to reshape or reinterpret 
the framework?
In the case of the forerunner in the field, i.e. the ICC pre arbitral referee procedure, we actually have 
information to suggest that pre-arbitral measures may in fact lack the dignity to qualify for 
enforcement under international agreements. Now this may in fact be due mostly to a lack of intent 
when drafting the rules, and some unfortunate wording. Nevertheless the issue bears closer 
examination.
That examination consists mostly of observation of the circumstances under which decision was 
rendered, and subsequent action was taken, in the Societe Nationale des Petroles du Congo and 
Republic of Congo v TEP Congo case at the Paris Court of Appeal in 2003.
This was the first time the nature of a pre-arbitral order was tried in a national court and fortunately 
the outcome and reasoning is public, although this in itself does point to another shortcoming of a 
process sought, among another things, for the sake of confidentiality (this is however another 
discussion). The outcome tells us several things (as follows in 5.2.1).
5.2.1 Congo Case
In the Congo case the Paris Court of Appeal was tasked with an annulment proceeding by the 
Republic of Congo, regarding an order by a pre-arbitral referee rendered with the ICC pre-arbitral 
referee procedure. 
The Republic of Congo held that the order constituted an award and thus was capable of being set 
aside by the French courts due to French law.34 The opposing party, TEP Congo, held that the order 
was not to be considered an award.
The court did render a decision - that the proceedings were inadmissible, and it did not actually go 
so far as to decide on the nature of the order. 
Instead the court started by examining the status of the referee, stating that if it went ahead and tried 
the status of the order without first determining the status of the source of the order it would then 
assume that the referee was actually empowered to render an award, and this the court was not 
willing to do. 
What the court wanted to decide was whether the referee had the same power as that of an arbitral 
tribunal. The court examined the foreword of the ICC rules and found that nowhere was the 
procedure characterized as arbitration. It further found that the nature of the proceeding was one 
derived from the contract between the parties and any resulting order did not have the res judicata 
status of an award - it was not a final decision. Since the court thus found the referee incapable of 
rendering final decisions, and there therefore could be no award to annul, the parties were referred 
34 - Article 1504 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for an action for annulment
of arbitral awards (sentences arbitrales) made in France in international matters on grounds of, among other
things, lack of jurisdiction or failure to respect due process.
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back to the arbitral tribunal that had to finally decide on the dispute. 
Now, some important considerations must be made. The court did not decide on the status of pre-
arbitral decisions as such, only on the status of ICC pre arbitral referees, but it did raise some 
excellent points that are of interest to us.
What is truly the status of a pre-arbitral "arbitrator" and how is it decided? The national courts 
obviously are unclear on the matter, so will it fall to the institutions to create a new tradition for the 
courts to follow? 
What of the matter of the finality of a decision? A pre-arbitral decision does not per definition 
resolve any dispute, yet the courts are asked to treat it with the same dignity as, at the very least, an 
interim award. What of the binding effects of a pre-arbitral decision? 
The SCC and other later adopters of pre-arbitral proceedings do have a different starting point in 
that the referee is actually identified as an arbitrator, and in the case of the SCC rules is said to be 
explicitly capable of rendering awards (due to a reference in the new emergency arbitral rules to art 
32.3 of the SCC rules).
But, lets not forget that the Paris court of appeal was actually more interested in the nature of the 
referee/arbitrator position than in any title that an institute chooses to confer on it. No institute 
stands on its own, and there needs to be a consensus within the community as regards the 
framework within which arbitration operates. The court also attached significance to the contract 
between the parties. Thus it would seem that in similar cases under the new generation of 
institutional rules (of which the SCC rules are part), if the parties can be shown to have had the 
intent to be bound by the decisions of an arbitrator in a pre-arbitral process, with the clear 
understanding that the institute and the parties explicitly confers the power of an arbitrator on the 
"referee", then perhaps this makes the position of pre-arbitrator into arbitrator. The following quote 
from the International Dispute Resolution publication illustrates the  point; 
"The Court considered that the question of appealability rested not on whether the referee’s  
decision was held to be an award or an order, but rather on the referee’s mandate."35
If we turn again to the ICC draft rules, Appendix II, art 9 set out the effects of an emergency 
decision. How then does it correspond to the ICC effects? 
Well, it is worth noticing that the SCC does not call the decision of the emergency arbitrator 
anything but a decision. It is not labelled an order or an award, and considering the rules clearly 
state it only has a temporary binding effect it would perhaps be hard to pass it off as anything else. 
The main difference then is that this decision (the SCC decision) is rendered by an arbitrator clearly 
appointed and pointed out as such. The implications of the temporary nature of the decision are 
discussed further in 5.2.2.1 on finality.
5.2.2 New York Convention
Emergency awards have a lot in common with interim measures. There have long been problems 
with the enforcement of interim measures by the worlds national courts, since the measures do not 
hold up well to the wording in the New York Convention of what is considered an enforceable 
award. Essentially they are temporary in nature, just like emergency awards are and this is not a 
desirable characteristic when it comes to enforceability.
Since the ICDR rules have been in existence and in effect for a couple of years now we have an 
35 International Dispute Resolution Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2003
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opportunity to examine some of the consequences of a modern pre-arbitral procedure. And the 
critical consequence concerns have mostly been about the enforceability of emergency decisions. 
Specifically, what use is it to have the procedure in place if there is no international legal framework 
in place to support it after all?
So what sort of framework does the ICDR solution (and by virtue of its similarities the SCC 
solution) rest upon? Well, just as with the more historically common practice of interim relief we 
come back to the New York Convention. The Convention states that an award must be confirmed 
and sanctioned unless it is found that one of the exceptions in Article 5 of the convention applies. 
These exceptions are, as follows:
(1) Incapacity of a party, or the legal invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate.
(2) There was a lack of proper notice of the arbitrator’s appointment or of the arbitration, 
or denial of the right to present one’s case. 
(3) That the award goes beyond the terms of the arbitration agreement. 
(4) That the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the arbitration agreement or the law
of the country where the arbitration took place.
(5) the award has not yet become binding, or was set aside by a competent authority.
5.2.2.1 Finality
Art 5.5 of the NYC is where the crux of the matter is. Interim measures of protection, and indeed 
emergency arbitral decisions, are highly temporary in nature. They are created to preserve the status 
quo in a conflict, and they do not have any finality. They live only up until the tribunal decides on 
the matter, and they resolve nothing on a lasting basis. With this in mind it is hard to see how the 
NYC could be used to enforce these decisions. However, in the case of interim relief the NYC is 
used for enforcement purposes. 
On interim relief US courts have reasoned that "arbitrators have authority to award interim relief in  
order to protect their final award from being meaningless".36 It is labelled a "process preserving 
decision", because to reason otherwise would mean the practice of interim relief would become, for 
all intents and purposes, meaningless.37 Similarly it was stated that “It is not the role of the courts to  
undermine the comprehensive grant of authority to arbitrators by prohibiting an arbitral security 
award that ensures a meaningful final award.”38
There is little reason to suspect other than that the the above same reasoning that the US courts have 
applied to interim measures of protection would also apply to emergency measures of protection, 
considering the way the courts have rationalized their decisions - basing them foremost on the needs 
of the arbitral system to function as intended. 
36 Yonir Technologies v. Duration Systems, 2nd Circuit
37 Arrowhead Global Solutions v. Datapath Inc, 4th Circuit
38 Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office, 2nd Circuit
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5.2.2.2 Award or Order
Furthermore, the US courts have chosen to disregard any distinction between an "order" and an 
"award" for the purposes of enforcing interim measures, treating them both as enforceable under the 
NYC. This is of importance for the SCC solution since under the proposed rules the emergency 
award is labelled a decision:
“Consistent use of the word ‘award’ when discussing final arbitral decisions does not bestow 
transcendental significance on the term … [and] content of a decision—not its nomenclature—
determines finality.”39
This leaves us with the procedure itself. If the award (or decision) itself is compatible with the New 
York Convention, is there anything else that could be challenged? 
There is the issue of speed as we have previously touched upon. Both the SCC and the ICDR rules 
provide an intentionally speedy resolution, as well as a quick entry into the resolution process, since 
both sets of rules call for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator within one day or 24 hours, 
with a decision coming, ideally, soon after this. The NYC states (art. 5) that an award does not need 
to be enforced if a "party against whom the award is invoked [...] was otherwise unable to present 
his case." Concerns have been raised in this regard over the ICDR rules, and since the SCC rules 
call for an even faster resolution (of only 5 days) there is reason to believe challenges could be 
made based on the inability to present ones case properly in the short time allotted. The ICDR time 
frame has been accepted by the arbitration community mainly due to the fact that there is no ex-
parte element to the process, seemingly excusing the short time allotted to present ones case. But in 
practice this may be due to the fact that on average the ICDR emergency relief cases tried to this 
day have produced decisions 14 days after initiation - somewhat longer than then 5 days envisioned 
by the SCC. 
It remains to be seen  if the SCC can live up to this undertaking. Ironically, it may be in the 
institutes best interest to extend, in practice, this time (note that this is possible according to the 
draft rules) in order to ensure that challenges are not made due to an inability to present ones case.
5.3 Ex Parte issues
Although ex-parte applications or proceedings are not part of any institutional arbitral emergency 
rules, there nevertheless exists a certain ex-parte element in that one side might end up with very 
little advance notification before having to present ones case before an arbitrator that holds 
extensive power to order measures affecting its assets. 
Stalling tactics have long been employed in arbitration proceedings, but even starting an emergency 
arbitral process might be very tactical indeed, if the goal is to affect assets of the other party in the 
short term, assets that might play an important role in  the relationship between the parties in 
matters not covered by the contract leading to arbitration. In this way the short notice and short 
timespan involved in emergency arbitration could have the same effect as if a party was not 
properly notified.
39 Publicis Communication v. True North Communications, 7th Circuit
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5.4 Scope of the emergency arbitrators powers
The SCC emergency arbitration rules give the arbitrator extensive powers, bestowing on him or her 
the same jurisdiction that a normal arbitrator serving under the SCC rules would have when it 
comes to interim measures. The extent of the measures available is constrained only by what the 
arbitrator "deems appropriate"40. 
It is conceivable that a challenge, in court, could be made as to whether an emergency measure 
really was appropriate, i.e. if the measure or relief granted really was within the scope of the 
emergency arbitrators powers, just as a the scope and jurisdiction of an ordinary arbitrators powers 
is sometimes challenged. However, what the courts will look at when deciding on the matter is, 
primarily, the SCC rules themselves, and the rules do grant arbitrators working under them 
extensive power. A party to a conflict in which it was agreed the solution would spring from SCC 
arbitration would be expected to be aware of this, and thus it is highly unlikely that the broad scope 
of the emergency arbitrators powers in itself would constitute valid grounds for a challenge. Again, 
in the case of the ICDR rules, where such challenges have been made, it was the opinion of a US 
court that “[courts] are required to give deference to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the Rule
and the Agreement unless they have clearly exceeded their authority.”
Additionally, let us consider why the rules on (emergency) interim measures are implemented the 
way they are by most institutions - They are crafted this way so that arbitrators can, at the end of the 
arbitration procedure, render an award that still carries any meaning. Without broad powers to order 
preservative measures (i.e. interim or emergency measures of protection) there is a high probability 
that many rewards would indeed become de facto worthless. Courts are likely to recognize and 
respect this.
5.5 Updated NYC
As has been discussed throughout this paper there may need to come into existence an update or 
clarification to the New York Convention, on interim measures and their status in general and on 
emergency arbitral processes and awards in particular. No such update is currently near, but due to 
the strong reliance on custom and perception in international law practice in itself may avert the 
need for one, once we start seeing some emergency awards actually enforced.
40 SCC rules art. 32, referenced by Appendix II art 1.2 of the same rules.
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6. Closing Comments
Having completed this work I am left with a feeling that emergency arbitration is indeed the way 
forward, and an understanding of why the different institutes are mostly all hard at work 
implementing new rules on the processes. But my findings seem to indicate that there may need to 
come into existence a new international consensus and framework, particularly on enforcement of 
these new rules. As it stands this area is something of a grey field, with different ideas on how 
exactly to make it all work, even if the will is there.
I have  pointed to some weaknesses in this new system of emergency measures. A system that 
changes the world of arbitration. As I have discussed, the all important New York Convention does 
not really cover this new type of  interim measure, and the foreseeability in employing the measures 
is currently not very good. This is because no one can say for sure how the different national courts 
will handle the issue of enforcement with no firm consensus on the status of emergency awards as 
yet in existence. 
The institutional administrative issues of the new system that I have touched upon can probably be 
handled, as the SCC and other institutes have gone to considerable trouble drafting workable and 
flexible rules, revising them and not actually implementing them until satisfied they will hold up to 
the task. The foreseeable problems lie mainly outside of institutional control, in the hands of 
national courts, and in the case of convention updates in the hands of national policy makers.
The SCC draft rules do seem to stand up well to what other institutes are implementing, and they 
have a modern and utilitarian approach. They may even be leading in the field. I can see other 
institutes keeping a close eye on what the SCC make of it all once the rules have been put to use. 
There is little doubt that we are in a time of important changes in how arbitration is conducted, and 
we are seeing (and will likely see) some interesting effects.
Göteborg, January 2010 (final version December 2010)
Karl Falk
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